Judicial Elections and Campaign Finance Reform by Schotland, Roy A.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2002 
Judicial Elections and Campaign Finance Reform 
Roy A. Schotland 
Georgetown University Law Center, schotlan@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/354 
 
33 U. Tol. L. Rev. 335-351 (2002) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Judges Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons 
GEORGETOWN LAW 
Faculty Publications 
 
 
 
 
 
April 2010 
 
 
 
Judicial Elections and Campaign Finance Reform 
 
 
 
 
 
33 U. Tol. L. Rev. 335-351 (2002) 
 
 
Roy A. Schotland 
Professor of Law 
Georgetown University Law Center 
schotlan@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from: 
Scholarly Commons:  http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/354/ 
 
Posted with permission of the author 
HeinOnline -- 33 U. Tol. L. Rev. 335 2001-2002
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 
PROFESSOR DEBOW' The tOPIC for the fourth and final panel today IS Judicial elections and campaign finance reform. My name IS Mike DeBow I teach 
at the Cumberland Law School at Samford UnIVersity, which IS m Bmnmgham, 
Alabama. 
If I say the name of my unIversity qUlckly enough, people thmk I live In 
Califorma. That IS not the case. I live m Alabama, and that IS why I am mterested 
m Judicial selectIOn. It IS really Impossible to live m Alabama WIthOUt formmg 
some sort of opmIOn about Judicial selectIOn, and I have one. 
I have been teachmg for fifteen years. I have never trIed to teach a class at 2:30 
on a FrIday afternoon, and I hope I am never asked to do such a thmg. So for those 
of you still with us, I salute you. I appreciate your presence here, particularly the 
students who are still With us. That shows a level of self-diSCipline that will stand 
you m good stead when you get mto practice. 
It IS perhaps mevltable that the question of judicIal campaIgn speech IS followed 
by the questIon of Judicial campaIgn finance and the possible reform of that 
practice. It certamly IS a tImely Issue for us to take up smce the country seems to 
be mterested, to one degree or another anyway, m the current debate over McCam-
Femgold l and the alternatives to It at the federal level. 
The general Issue of money m politics IS a vexmg one for many people. It raises 
a number of very mtrIgumg constItutIOnal questIOns, and questIons for varIOUS 
SOCial sCientists. In partIcular, the questIOn of causatIOn, I thmk, IS mterestmg here. 
Are conservatIve candidates conservative so that they can raise money from 
conservatIve donors, or does the causation run the other way around, wIth liberal 
donors seekmg out liberal candidates and conservative donors seekmg out 
conservatIve candidates? Is It Just that SImple? 
In the Judicial realm, the Issue of campaign finance cuts across all states that use 
any form of election as part of their selectIon or retentIon system, whether the 
electIOns are partisan or non-partisan. 
The raIsmg of money for campaIgns IS a task that has to be performed m all states 
that use any form of electIon. Like many other thmgs that we have discussed today 
It seems to mvolve a sort ofbalancmg act. The state certamly has a strong mterest 
m protectmg the mtegrlty of its JudicIary and encouragmg the public perceptIon of 
the Judiciary as an mstItutIon of mtegrlty and honor. On the other hand, there are 
ObVIOusly First Amendment mterests of the candidates and then contributors to be 
taken mto account. 
There seem to be three questIOns that we should take up today, to one degree or 
another. First of all, what IS the range of current practIce m campaign 
fundralSlng-on behalf of judicial candidates? Secondly, what, if anythmg, would 
be preferable to current practIce? And thirdly, what reforms, if any, would be 
constitutIOnally permissible? 
1. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of2001, S. 27, 107th Congo (2001). 
335 
HeinOnline -- 33 U. Tol. L. Rev. 336 2001-2002
336 UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LA W REVIEW [Vol. 33 
We have a very distmgulshed panel to help us address these questions. I will 
mtroduce them m the order m which they will speak. First to speak will be, to my 
far left, Professor Roy Schotland of the Georgetown Law School faculty, who IS a 
natIOnally recogmzed expert on Judicial selectIOn. 
Most recently, he was the co-convener, with Texas Chief Justice Thomas 
Phillips, and the Texas Senate President, Rodney Ellis, of a Chief Justices summit, 
which met last December, With seventeen Chief Justices workmg on the problems 
of state JudiCial electIOns and producmg some twenty recommendations. 
Professor Schotland has been workmg on JudiCial electIOns for almost twenty 
years. He IS a graduate of Columbia Umverslty, Oxford Umverslty, and Harvard 
Law School. Followmg law school, he clerked for Justice Brennan, worked for a 
time m the New York firm of Paul Weiss. He has worked on Capitol Hill and m 
several executIve agencies, and m five campaigns, all DemocratIc he tells me. He 
has taught also, m additlOn to Georgetown, at the Umverslty of Virgmla Law 
School and the Umversity of Pennsylvania Law School. He teaches Admmlstratlve 
Law, Electlon Law, and Constitutional Law at Georgetown. We are very pnvileged 
to have him wlth us today. 
Our second speaker IS Jan Baran, who IS a partner wlth the Washmgton D.C. firm 
of Wiley, Rem & Fielding. He IS the head of the firm's electIOn law and 
government ethics practice and has been With the firm smce 1985. He IS a graduate 
of Ohio Wesleyan Umverslty and Vanderbilt Umverslty Law School. 
Among other actiVIties, Mr. Baran has served as the General Counsel of the 
Republican National Committee from 1989 to 1992, and the 1988 Bush for 
PreSIdent campaign. He has been the Chairman of the ABA Standing Committee 
on Election Law and a member of the ABA CommIssIon on Public Financmg of 
JudiCial CampaIgns. He IS the author of a book titled The ElectIOn Law PrImer for 
CorporatlOns.2 
Finally, I wanted to note that Washzngtonzan Magazzne mcluded him m theIr 
1997 Issue m an article entItled, "Heavy Hitters,"3 whIch list the top fifty lawyers 
m Washmgton D.C. That IS qUite a recommendatlOn. 
To gIve us a view from the Bench, we are pleased to have Justice CraIg Enoch 
from the Texas Supreme Court. JustIce Enoch has undergraduate and law degrees 
from Southern Methodist Umverslty, and an LL.M. from the Umverslty ofVirgmla 
Law School. 
He has been a Judge for twenty years, believe It or not. You could not tell that 
to look at him, I do not thmk. He began hiS Judicial career on the 10 1 st Dlstnct 
Court m Dallas County, Texas m 1981, where he served from 1981 to 1987 He 
was then Chief JustIce of the Fifth District Court of Appeals at Dallas from 1987 
through 1992. He was then elected to hiS first term on the Texas Supreme Court; 
the term began January 1st, 1993. He was reelected m 1998 to a second term. 
2. JAN WrrolD BARAN, THE ElECTION LAW PRIMER FOR CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 2000). 
3. Kim Isaac Eisler, Heavy Hitters: Suddenly Hit with a Subpoena? Served with Divorce 
Papers? Facmg an IRS Audit? Here Are the 50 Washmgton Lawyers Who Really Get Results, 
WASHINGTON1AN,Feb. 1997, at 70. 
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In additIOn, Justice Enoch fulfills many CIVIC and professIOnal roles. He IS, 
among other thmgs, currently the Vice-Chairman of the ABA JudicIal DIvIsIon's 
Appellate Judges' Conference, and a member of the Amencan Law Institute. 
Professor Schotland will begm, followed by Mr. Baran and then Justice Enoch. 
Each speaker will speak for fifteen to twenty mmutes. We will follow It up wIth a 
questIOn and answer penod. 
PROFESSOR SCHOTLAND: Thanks, Mike. It IS a pnvilege and pleasure to be here 
wIth you. I never thought of the Federalist SocIety as meek, but I am authontattvely 
told, "The meek shall mhent the earth." And you all sure are mhentmg the earth. 
(Laughter.) 
The last panel IS a very hard act to follow. Not m the normal sense of they were 
good, but I was struck, and maybe you were, that each one was not only persuasive, 
but really very appealing. They were appealing guys. 
I thmk Lubet was on to somethmg when he notIced that they had not gIven hIm 
a name card, because I notIced that I had been put at the far left. 
(Laughter.) 
By the way, I do not know how many of you notIced that they were all guys, as 
we are all guys. I counted It up today and It IS sixteen to three. And maybe you 
thmk that IS better than I thmk that IS. 
Let me start WIth Sergeant Fnday's approach, whIch IS, if you remember: Just 
the Facts. That IS an Important step toward meetmg our problems. I thmk the first 
thmg we need to do IS clear away two myths that cloud thiS scene. 
The two myths compete. There IS the demal myth, which tries to deny how 
hugely electIOn systems dommate our election of state Judges. That competes 
agamst the distortIOn myth, whIch tnes to pamt the candidates m these electIons as 
panderers who care more about campaIgn contributIOns than about JustIce or 
mtegnty 
The deOlal myth surfaces all m the tIme m the media coverage of JudiCial 
elections. We had several last fall. I remember from the October 1999 Federalist 
annual meetmg when you had some very ImpreSSIve whIte papers on "should there 
be JudiCIal electIOns or should not there be JudiCial electIOns?" 
And they eVidently had not really exchanged the papers before they distributed, 
and they could not agree on how many states did or did not have electIOns, and what 
kmds of electIons. We get thiS all the tIme. 
USA Today thiS fall said there were twenty-one states that elect Judges and State 
Supreme Court Jushces.4 That did not mclude a couple of easily overlooked states: 
CalifornIa, Flonda, Indiana, and a number of others. That IS not USA Today's fault, 
but the fault of the source from which they get the data. 
And The Washmgton Post saId eIght states had partIsan Supreme Court 
elections,S whIch IS the same myth-makmg source-the Amencan Judicature 
SOCIety IS m demal. There are not eight. There are eleven WIth partisan Supreme 
Court electIons, unless you really believe that OhIO IS non-partIsan. And if so, I do 
not know what newspapers you read or what you listen to. Or you really believe that 
4. See Campaign Contributions Corrupt JudiCial Races, USA TODAY, Sept. 1,2000, at AI6. 
5. See George Lardner Jr., Speech Rights and EthiCS Disputed In Judiczal Races, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 8, 2000, at AI3. 
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Michigan IS non-partisan. Actually, another one IS Idaho, which was genumely non-
partisan until 1998; and m 1998 and 2000, became partisan. 
The demal myth alms at makmg us feel better about Judicial elections by 
pretending, counter-factually, that there IS not that much of them. The competmg 
myth makes us feel worse about Judicial electIOns by pretending that a great many 
of the people who run for the Bench, and therefore have to raise campaign funds, 
are mvolved III what IS labeled by a Texas so-called study as "Payola Justice" or III 
an OhIO so-called study, "Justice for Sale." 
Of all of these studies, I know of only one by my colleague, Steve Ware, which 
has the simple mtegnty to put It correctly- Correlation IS not causation. 
Let me give Just one example of the distortIOn myth. The attack on the OhIO 
Supreme Court by the Amencan Fnends Service Committee of Northern OhiO. 
They brought thiS out about fourteen months ago. It got a great deal of mk m the 
OhIO press, but not an atom of analysIs. I was actually very disappomted m some 
of the Justices who spoke on It. It seems they spoke, Without anythmg m the way 
of diggmg mto It. 
The study reported what It called the "compliance ratlllgs" of the OhiO Justices; 
that IS, how often they would vote for the Side represented by a lawyer who had 
made a contribution. 
For example, Chief Justice Tom Moyer had a compliance ratmg of74.8%. That 
IS three-quarters of the time, he voted with the Side represented by a large 
contributor. 
And the media seemed to take for granted that if that kmd of analYSIS came from 
that kInd of source, about people who raise campaign contributIOns, it must be 
sound. 
Let me give you Just two facts about the study The method gives, for example 
Moyer, a 50% ratIng if, for example, he decided a case, and m that case, on one 
Side, the lawyer gave him 50 bucks, and he decides for that Side. And on the other 
Side IS a lawyer who gave him 5,000 bucks; he decides agamst that Side, he has got 
a 50% compliance ratmg. "The house cannot lose." 
Is thiS honest muckraklllg, or IS thiS sheer mudslingmg? One other fact about the 
study' they list law firms. And the one that contributed most, that IS, was mvolved 
III the largest number of cases III which they made contributIOns, was a law firm 
called Atty Gen, A-T-T-Y G-E-N. 
(Laughter. ) 
Now, I tned to clear up Just exactly what the firm IS. And let me say very Simply, 
to keep thlllgs polite, that I was rebuffed, "We can't be bothered With these 
questIOns." 
It appears, gOlllg by the cases m·whlch Atty Gen was on one Side, that these are 
the members of the elected Attorney General's Office of OhIO. Now, they do have 
substantial docket busmess 10 the high court, and they might even wm some cases. 
And SInce It IS an elected office, It IS not surpnsmg that some of them contribute. 
The study did not give Just how much they had contributed. 
That was about thirty-plus percent of the cases that had Atty Gen on one Side. 
You can see what that does to the so-called compliance ratmgs. These awful people 
are votmg for the state. 
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May I suggest that attackers producmg studies like thiS, and always clalmmg the 
moral high ground, lack mtegnty far more clearly than their targets. 
Now, I am not saymg there are not campaign finance problems 10 OhIO. A 
leading recent example, agam your Supreme Court-a SUlt for damages agamst 
Conrail. I do not know how many of you know about the Wightman SUlt.6 A gIrl 
was killed by a tram when she drove onto a grade crossmg despite the flashmg 
lights and the gates all but barrmg her. 
The extensive proceedings mvolved three trials: first, a JUry trial, then a bench 
trial for pumtive damages, and then after an appeal, a JUry trial for pumtIves. 
Then, there followed another appeal, followed by takmg It to your Supreme 
Court. The effort to get your Supreme Court to review the case was sought by both 
Sides because the JUry had awarded "pums" of $25 mil, and the tnal Judge had 
reduced that to $15 mil. 
I assume you would all like to be the plamtiff's lawyer on thiS case. The share 
IS better than ten dollars an hour. The plamtiff was represented by a firm that 
mclude mne members of the Murray family, Murray and Murray 7 
Before the Court agreed three years ago to hear the appeal, two of the Justices 
(not mcluding Moyer) got contributIOns from mne of the Murrays, every Murray 10 
the firm, and seven Murray spouses. 
On February 28th, 1998, the high court deCided to take the appeal. The 
contributIOns had come to one Justice on February 9, 1998, for the other Justice 
between January 19 and January 21 
Every contributIOn complied With the relative legal limits, as did the aggregation 
of contributIOns to each Justice. The Justices ran 10 November of 1998. And 
according to their post-campaIgn, post-electIOn reports, the contributIOns from thiS 
one firm and spouses turned out to be 4.4% of the total pot for one JustIce, 4.7% of 
the other's. For each JustIce, they were the largest source of support. Both Justices 
participated 10 the oral argument on November 10, 1998. Their reports were filed 
one month later. 
In January 1999, Conrail filed a motIOn seekmg theIr recusal before a deCISIOn. 
In October 1999, Without the Court or either Justice addressmg that motion at that 
time, or earlier, or later, the Court deCided 10 favor of the plamtiffs. 
Conrail sought certlOran, makmg the contribution pattern one of their major 
bases. Cert was demed.8 
We had a Similar concentrated source of support 10 Michigan 10 1998 from one 
firm that gave $225,000 to three Democratic candidates. That totaled 29% of one 
candidate's total pot; 19% for another. And of the three, the one who got the least, 
18%, was a former partner of the firm-sort of Iromc. 
Now, OhiO has a $5,000 mdivldual contributton cap, but no caps on the 
aggregates from a firm. Texas IS the only state 10 the country that does put a cap on 
the aggregate from a firm. By "aggregate from a firm," I mean, partners, 
employees, asSOCiates, and any political action committee if affiliated, and so forth. 
6. Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp. (Conrail), 86 OhIO St. 3d 431 (1999). 
7. Murray & Murray IS located In Sandusky, OhIO. 
8. Consol. Rail Corp. (Conrail) v. Wightman, 529 U.S. 1012 (2000). 
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Texas, like OhIO, has a $5,000 Individual cap. But unlike OhIO, Texas says, "No 
firm can give more than $30,000." Now, you might quibble over whether thirty IS 
too high or too low. What they are tryIng to do IS to accommodate a fair balance 
between essentially the two sides of so many of those controversies, the plaIntiff s 
bar and the defense bar 
And the plamtiff's bar IS by and large very small firms. And if you have nothmg 
but an mdivldual cap, you are glVlng an enormous advantage to bIg firms and the 
bIg firms' candidates. 
So, I applaud Texas for leading what should be done, and I would be mterested 
m any reactIons any of you would have to whether It IS completely artificIal to put 
on, or too close to artificIal to put on, an mdivldual cap wIthout puttmg on also an 
aggregate cap. 
In the summer of 1999, the Amencan Bar House of Delegates amended the 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct to add varIOus recommendations With respect to 
campaign finance, that there should be, of course, full and effective disclosure, that 
there should be contribution limits. They did not mclude the recommendatIOn that 
there should be an aggregate for firms, and that IS a gap. 
But a good way of makmg sure the limits will be adhered to IS to say that If any 
lawyer gIves more than the limit, It IS automatic recusallf the other Side says, "Our 
adversaries gave more than the limit. Sorry, Your Honor, good-bye." The Judge 
would have to go. 
And that, too, IS now m the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. The Model Code 
has been essentially adopted m somewhere between thIrty-two and thlrty-mne of the 
thirty-mne states with Judicial electIOns, I do not know whether It will take ten years 
or 100 years before these amendments are adopted m vanous states. 
But thIS IS clearly a way that we are movmg. And obViously, the sooner, the 
better. 
Another one of those provISIons IS that no judge can appomt a lawyer as a speCial 
master, guardian, etcetera, if that lawyer has given more than the contribution cap, 
unless there are extraordinary circumstances or, of course, If It IS pro bono. 
We are not gOIng to get nd of JudiCIal elections. There has been an absolutely 
major effort by the Bar and so much more than the Bar at least SInce 1906, and we 
have brought the proportIOn of state judges who face. electIOn for some type all the 
way down to 87%. 
If you take out retention electIOns, you have got 53% of state appellate Judges 
facmg contestable electIOns; 77% of trial judges 10 general j unsdiction courts facmg 
contestable elections. 
At the rate of this 1 OO-year effort, we will end JudiCial electIons to the appellate 
bench m about 160 years, and for the tnal bench m 770 years. 
Now, the great Arthur T Vanderbilt saId, as you have probably all heard a 
thousand times, "Judicial reform IS not for the short-wmded." But I thlOk 160 years, 
let alone 770, IS a little long. And we have got to focus 10 on campaign finance and 
the campaIgn conduct. 
One of the best steps we could take would be to lengthen terms. Here 10 OhIO, 
you have six-year terms. I Implore your ChIef Justice, and others who agree WIth 
hIm, to not put all your energy mto gomg for merit selectIOn, which IS not gomg to 
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happen, and to put real energy mto getting that six-year term up to, I would hope, 
even ten years, maybe even more than ten. 
All by Itself, Just think of lengthemng terms, what that does In the way of 
reducmg campaign finance problems, reducmg campaign conduct problems. And 
does not It make the Job of bemg a Judge more attractIve') And if the Job IS more 
attractIVe, are you not likely to get better people seekmg It and staYing In It? 
And Isn't the whole venture about gettmg the best people we can onto the bench? 
Thank you. 
PROFESSOR DEBOW' Thank you, Professor Schotland. We will hear next from 
Jan Baran. 
MR. BARAN: Thank you very much. It IS a pleasure to be here. I grew up m 
OhiO for a stretch of my life. I lived In Northeast OhiO, and went to school In 
Central OhiO. My mother taught at a umverslty campus m Southeastern OhlO. 
However, I had never been to thIS quadrant of OhlO. Now I have been here twice 
m four weeks to exactly the same place and the same podium. So, I do not know 
If thiS IS a Sign that my destmy IS somehow linked to Toledo, OhlO and thIS 
particular law school. 
I am pleased to be here to address the Issue of campaign finance In the context 
of judiCIal electIOns. CampaIgn finance IS a subject to which I have devoted almost 
thIrty years of my life, both profeSSIOnally and politically I ran a campaIgn for 
governor ofMame m 1973 and 1974 that was subject to Mame s campaIgn finance 
laws. I went to see the arguments in Buckley v. Valeo9 in 1975. I spent two years 
at the Federal ElectIOn CommIsSIon, and I have been in contmuous pnvate practtce 
representmg clients on these types of Issues all over the country smce 1979 
ThIS past week, you may have read, we had the second week of debate m the 
Umted States Senate regarding the McCam-Femgold Bill. lO A couple of reporters 
called me to discuss the legIslatIOn and asked me how 1 felt about It? I saId, "I feel 
like a tow-truck operator who has Just learned that there IS a hundred car pile-up on 
the mterstate." 
(Laughter. ) 
CampaIgn finance IS such a difficult tOPIC With which to come to gripS because 
of the mherent constItutIonal conslderatlOns that present themselves when 
attemptmg to regulate campaIgns. 1 want to Just summarIze some of the Issues With 
which I, along WIth the other members of the Amencan Bar AssoclatlOn's 
Commission on Public Financmg of JudiCIal Campaigns, have been grappling. We 
have struggled With these Issues because we have been reluctant to propose any 
regulatIOn of JudiCIal campaIgn funding unless and until we are comfortable With 
the constItutional parameters In domg so. 
The constttutlOnal diSCUSSIOn to date stems essentially from the 1976 deCISIon m 
Buckley v. Valeo. 1I The subject of the case was the Federal Election Campaign Act 
of 1971, as amended m 1974, which was the most comprehenSIVe federal campaign 
9. 424 U.S. I (1976). 
10. See Bipartisan Campaign Refonn Act of2001, S. 27 I07th Congo (2001). 
II. 424 U.S. at I. 
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finance reform to have been enacted. 12 The four mam pnnclples of regulatIOn that 
were m the Act seem fairly common to us today, but were qUlte new at that time. 
The first pnnclple was disclosure. Can the government mandate the disclosure 
of how campaign money IS receIved and spent? The Supreme Court saId "yes." 
Specifically the Court concluded that the government could reqUIre both campatgn 
contributors to be Identified by name and amount contributed, and campaIgn 
expenditures to be ItemIzed by reCIpIent and amount. 
The second prmclple of regulation was based on whether political contributions 
can be limited m amount. The Supreme Court agam said "yes" and upheld the 
reasonable limit of$I,OOO for contributIOns to candidates for the House, Senate, or 
PresIdent. The Senate, Just thiS past week, you may have read, mcreased that limit 
m the McCam-Femgold Bill to $2,000. 
This raises the mterestmg question of exactly how much money will George W 
Bush raise m 2004 as a sittmg president? Of course, last year, he raised a mere 
$105 million under a $1,000 contributIOn limit, and not as a Sitting President of the 
UOlted States. And I fear or expect the possibility that m 2004, he might, at the very 
least, double the amount that he ralsed m the last election. 
The third pnnclple addressed by the Supreme Court was the regulatIOn of 
expenditures of money for political purposes. The Act had a spending limIt of 
$70,000 on the amount a candidate for the House of Representatives could spend 
m a pnmary, and an equal limltation on the amount that could be spent m the 
general election. The Supreme Court struck down the limit saymg that although 
limits on contributions are stmply margmal mterferences WIth the speech and 
assoclatIonal nghts of campaign contributors, a spending limIt IS a direct, 
substantial, and unconstitutional mterference with the ability of a candidate's 
campaign to commUnIcate With the public and to convey the candidate's message. 
This led the Supreme Court to conclude that limItmg the amount of money that an 
mdivldual can put mto hiS or her own campaign IS also unconstItutIOnal. 
On the other hand, the Court stated that the public funding system that Congress 
had deVised for preSIdential campaigns survived constitutional scrutmy because It 
was voluntary The Court determmed that If the government deCides to provide 
public funds to a candidate, the government can condition the receipt of public 
funds on a candidate's agreement not to spend over a certam amount. 
Finally, the Buckley Court addressed the pnncIple of mdependent speech. Can 
the government regulate speech of mdivlduals who deCide to go out and buy 
newspaper ads, publish leaflets, put advertisement on teleVISion or radio? The Act 
had a limIt of $1,000 that people could spend, mdependent of a candidate, for a 
political message that the Supreme Court defined as a message that expressly 
advocated either the election or defeat of a clearly Identified candidate. The Court 
struck down thiS limitation, but upheld disclosure reqUIrements for mdependent 
speech that contamed the above described express advocacy 
The Buckley Court's cIrcumscnptlon of the Act provides the current 
constitutIOnal construct WIth respect to regulatmg campaign finance. Now the 
McCam-Femgold Bill IS attemptmg to stretch, and perhaps test, some of those 
twenty-five year old constructs. For example, there IS a prOVISIOn m the bill that 
12. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971)(codified as amended at 2 U.S.c. §§ 431-456 (1994». 
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makes It a cnme for a corporatlon, umon, Incorporated trade associatIOn, or any 
Incorporated group to pay for advertisIng that either contaInS the name of a 
candidate, or the Image of a candidate, dunng a specific penod of time, namely 
SIXty days before a general electIOn or thirty days before a pnmary electIOn. 
There IS not a whole lot of case law on thiS type of speech regulatIOn. The only 
case that comes to my mInd IS Mills v. Alabama.13 In the early 1960s, the State of 
Alabama had passed a statute that prohibited political speech on electIOn day No 
one, Including a newspaper, was penmtted to endorse candidates or subsidize or pay 
for speech on that one day of the year. The Supreme Court said that thiS prohibition 
was unconstitutIOnal under the First Amendment and struck down the statute. 
Since then, the Supreme Court has not addressed anythIng approachIng that type 
of regulatIOn. There was an attempt In Michigan to prohibIt certaIn types of speech 
dunng a specified time penod. I believe It was forty-five days. The restrIction was 
promulgated as a regulatIOn, and was struck down by two federal distrIct courts III 
Michigan. 14 Withm the last couple of years, there was a SImilar restrIctIon on the 
dissemInation of votIng records dunng the SIxty-day tIme penod preceding an 
election In West VirgInIa. That prohibItion was also struck down by the distrIct 
court m that state. 15 
In contrast WIth the approach taken by the McCam-Femgold bill, if we are gomg 
to somehow contend WIth the Supreme Court and the ongmal Buckley paradigm, 
how IS thIS gomg to potentIally transfer to JudiCIal campaIgns? The first questIOn 
that arIses IS, are JudiCial campaigns constItutionally different from campaIgns for 
the House, the Senate, or PreSIdent? Is there somethmg umque, or at least 
distIngUIshable, about a JudiCIal campaIgn that would allow a type of regulation 
that, otherwIse, would not be permItted m a race for the legislature? 
The most recent eVidence or case law that we have on thiS questIon arose here m 
OhIO. The OhIO Supreme Court Implemented a rule to place a limIt on how much 
a candidate for the Supreme Court may spend. Unlike the public finanCIng scheme 
that was addressed III Buckley, thIS was a unilateral spending limit, the same as that 
which was Imposed by Congress m the Federal ElectIon Campaign Act and 
subsequently struck down by the Supreme Court m Buckley The Sixth CirCUIt 
Similarly struck down the OhIO Supreme Court limitatIOn as unconstitutIOnal, saymg 
that there was no constItutIonal difference between a limit on JudiCial candidate 
spending and the spending that was struck down m Buckley So, the mltIal 
mdicatlon from the courts, though not the U.S. Supreme Court, IS that there IS 
nothmg Significantly different about runmng for state Supreme Court than for 
Senator m the State of OhiO that would JustIfy a unilateral spending limit. 
The second questIon that arises IS whether contributIOns to JudiCial candidates 
can be limited. We have a $5,000 limit on contributIOns to JudiCIal candidates here 
m OhiO. That IS very typical of other types oflimlts that are Imposed on legislatIve 
races. However, there IS a very major practical conSideratIon here, which IS that the 
judges are not really m the same posItIon as IndiVIduals mnmng for Senate. Their 
13. 384 U.S. 214 (1966). 
14. See Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Mich. v. Miller, 21 F Supp. 2d 740 (£.0. Mich 1998); 
RIght to Life of Mich. v. Miller, 23 F Supp. 2d 766 (W.D. Mich. 1998). 
15. See West VirgInIans for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 960 F Supp. 1036 (S.D. W Va. 1996). 
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constItuency IS much smaller. If you are a Untted States Senator or candidate for 
Senate, you presumably will have many many more OhIOans who are mterested In 
your race. Therefore, your pool of contributIOns will be larger. On the other hand, 
we know from expenence that the likely contributors to a JudiCial race are, 
according to Roy, gomg to be lawyers. I mean, your other optIOns are litigants, 
Jurors, and people who work at the courthouse. But otherwise, you are dealing 
With a much smaller pool of potential contributors. 
Third, what about mdependent speech? And thiS IS a hot Issue. We have an 
mcreasmg number of examples of mdependent groups that are paymg for 
advertlsmg. There have been no allegatIOns that these groups are a part of a 
candidate's campaign. In fact, candidates have been growmg frustrated that they 
have no control over these groups which are spending more and more money on thiS 
type of mdependent speech. 
With these Issues illummated m the context of judicial races we must then search 
for a possible solutIOn. One that we are constantly pomted to IS public funding. 
Perhaps public funding will help address many of the constItutIOnal consideratIOns, 
as well as help mamtaln JudiCial Independence. 
On ItS face, public financmg has a great deal of appeal. Most would agree that 
It would be nIce to provide funding for Judicial candidates so they do not have to 
raise money, so they do not have to go and seek pnvate support from a relattvely 
small pool of potentIal contributors who are likely to be mterested In the JudiCial 
system and perhaps the outcome of cases that have to be deCided by these 
mdivlduals. 
There IS one state that has public funding ofjudictal races, WisconSin, which has 
had publicly funded JudiCial races smce 1977 They have encountered some 
problems With It, not the least of which IS that It IS very difficult to convmce the 
politiCians to fund such a system. AdditIOnally, you heard the Justice thiS mommg 
say that she participated m the public funding system last time and received less 
than $15,000 m public funding for her campaign. This IS not unusual. The history 
at least for the last decade, IS that the candidates generally do not participate In the 
public funding system. The good news for the JustIces IS that there has not been an 
mcumbentJusttce who has lost m Wisconsm smce 1966. So, It does not seem that 
Wisconsm s public funding system presents them With a great rIsk of compromise. 
Maybe there IS a lot more to be said about Wisconsm and why public funding 
works. Perhaps It IS because of their culture. Maybe they have not had any big 
controversies regarding tort reform, abortion, or whatever Issue seems to be stIrrIng 
up constItuencies elsewhere. 
So, we are lookmg at public funding to see if it IS an optIon. I thmk there IS a big 
questIon as to whether or not It will work, even if we can convmce legislatures to 
prOVide the funding, even if the limits are large enough. The questIOns remam, 
well, what happens If wealthy candidates Wish to run for JustIce, and what effect 
will thiS have on mdependent spending by groups who mSlst on havmg somethmg 
to say and pay for large amounts of advertlsmg? 
Under the Buckley paradigm, a wealthy mdivldual cannot be limited m the 
amount of money he or she puts mto a campaign, even a campaign for Supreme 
Court Justice. 
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Agam, under the current Supreme Court restnctIOns, there IS nothmg that can be 
done to curtail or limIt mdependent speech, although there are some deVices that are 
bemg proposed 10 some states, whIch would trIgger more public funding for 
candidates faced WIth these CIrcumstances. 
Finally, one of the Issues that has to be addressed 10 any campaign finance system 
IS who IS gomg to regulate all of thIs, and how will thIS apply to JudiCIal campaIgns? 
In Buckley, one of the thmgs the Court eventually upheld was an mdependent 
agency to regulate federal electIOns. That IS the Federal ElectIOn CommissIOn. 
Each state, I believe, now has an ElectIOn CommISSIon to regulate campaIgn 
financmg of general electIOns. Most often, they will also have a role 10 regulatmg 
the funding of JudiCIal electIOns. However, I thmk thIS regulatory Issue IS more 
complex 10 the JudiCIal electIOn context. 
We have the orgamzed Bar, which may have a role on occaSIOn. We have the 
court Itself, and we have discIplinary commIttees. In that regard, It IS startmg to 
look mcreasmgly like the system we have 10 Washmgton, where If you are a 
Congressman, you are not only subject to the Federal ElectIon CommISSIon, you 
also have the House EthICS Committee that you have to worry about, and you might 
even have to deal With the JustIce Department and the Office of Government EthICS. 
That IS an outline of the constitutIOnal conSideratIons. As you can tell, I did not 
come here WIth any answers. In the year I have spent on the ABA CommiSSIOn, 
what we have developed IS great expertIse m Identtfymg all of the questtons. If you 
have any apparent solutIons to any of these questIOns, we would all like to hear 
them. Thank you. 
PROFESSOR DEBOW' Thank you, Jan. Our final speaker today IS JustIce Enoch, 
and that will be followed by your questIons. 
JUSTICE ENOCH: Thank you, Mike, and good afternoon. Thanks for the 
opportumty to be here. I guess I am umquely qualified to be talkmg about campaIgn 
finance reform smce 10 my two races 10 Texas I raIsed, for Just my race, over $3.6 
million. And so, now, let us talk about limItmg that campaIgn fundraIsmg that I 
have. 
(Laughter.) 
I thmk It IS faIr to say that the public IS conflicted over ItS relatIonshIp WIth ItS 
Judges. At once the public wants Its Judges to be mdependent, but also accountable. 
And I call that a conflict because I suggest mdependence and accountability are 
necessarily concepts 10 tenSIOn. And we have heard that earlier today 
In fact, I would suggest they are polar oPPosItes. James Madison, one of the 
founders of the Federalist movement, mSIsted that a system of mdependent courts 
would be an Impenetrable bulwark of liberty 
And JustIce Clarence Thomas argues that It IS JudiCIal unaccountability that 
fosters Impartiality and adherence to the rule of law, even when do 109 so, stands 10 
oppOSItion to the popular WIshes. 
Now, assume WIth me, If you will, that our diSCUSSIons today SImply recognIze 
the reality ofthls conflict of these Ideals, that what we are ImpliCitly acknowledgmg 
IS that we want our Judges to be mdependent, but Just not too mdependent. And we 
want our Judges to be accountable, but Just not too accountable. 
Perhaps 1 could be a little bit more pomted. Are we not really saymg, "I want my 
judge to be mdependent to them, but I want my Judge to be accountable to me?" 
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In the mld-l 970s, Texas tned to rewnte Its constitutIOn. And the Judicial section 
established ment selectIOn retentIOn electIOn for the judges. The State's party 
platform for the Republican Party of Texas called for that proposal. And that 
provIsion has disappeared from the platform. 
Now I cannot say, for a fact, why that happened. But my educated guess IS 
because shortly thereafter, Republican Judges started gett10g elected to the Bench. 
Their judges started 10s1Og, and our judges started w1Omng. 
So, let us look at the Texas expenence. We have been elect10g Judges on a 
partisan ballot for over 100 years. To say that these electIOns, because Texas was 
a one-party state for most of that time, were non-partisan IS really not correct. 
There were tremendous battles wlthm the Democratic Party the conservatIve 
populist and liberal Democrats. 
Also, It IS misleading to say that the judges 10 Texas are elected. Upwards of 
80% of judges came to the bench by gubernatonal appo1Otment. And I have heard 
that 80% of those, if they had a pnmary opponent In their very first electIOn, never 
had another electIOn until their retirement. 
Now, because of the evolv1Og two-party state we have, we have a few more 
contests. But the percentage of the retamedJudges still holds at about 60%, maybe 
a little bit above It. 
In short, Texas has an appo1Otment retentIOn system. It IS Just that the 
appo1Otment IS ad hoc, and a retention election IS open to Influences that have 
noth1Og to do With the ments of the judge. 
Let us talk about reform. The quality of the Judge s deCISion IS very hard to 
measure. In fact, I suggest to you It cannot be measured. It may be an 
overSimplification, but It seems to me that only lawyers care why a court ruled the 
way It did. The public only cares about what the court's ruling IS. 
Now, It was Interestmg, the last session that was here, I kInd of enjoyed It. You 
know, the First Amendment, tell It like It IS. More InformatIOn IS better. 
We have a little bit of a debate gomg on. What IS the role of the judges and what 
should they say? If you are go1Og to elect them, then let them say everythmg. 
But then, the speakers all sort of agreed there are some thIngs judges should not 
say, nght? Well, these views are legal nIceties. I am telling you, the public does 
not care about your reasons for your deCISion; they only care what you deCided. 
And I suggest 10 the electIOn of judges, why wouldn't the public be entItled to 
demand of the judge how they are gOIng to rule In a particular case because what 
else are you elect10gthejudges for? What else do you elect judges for except to be 
your representatIve on the Bench; to elect our Judges, as opposed to their Judges? 
I thInk It IS a legal nIcety to say that an Issue may come before me, and therefore, 
I cannot comment on It. But if a voter cannot get your commitment, what else are 
you askmg for theIr vote for? 
Now, I'm glv10g you the extreme because of my campaign In 1992. That was the 
pOSitIOn of my opponent. My opponent said that he had a constituency and he had 
been elected to represent hIS constituency on the Court. I challenged him In that 
electIOn, and I won, though Republicans were not w1On1Og stateWide In Texas. 
The questIOn was asked earlier today, why do we see all thiS money gett10g In 
these state JudiCial races? I suggest to you an answer New federalism. ThiS IS not 
New Federalism of Justice Brennen who encouraged state supreme courts to look 
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at their state constitutions for gUIdance on personal liberties. I am talkmg about the 
fact that the Untted States Supreme Court IS now saymg that "Not every Issue 
deserves a natIOnal solutIOn. We want to see what the states are gomg to decide." 
Let's look at tort refonn both m Congress and state legislatures, major battles over 
tort reform are occurnng. Because state legislatures have been more actIve, the 
state supreme courts are where the action IS. 
For example, pumtive damages IS a big Issue both m the busmess communtty and 
the plamttff's bar. And legislative limits on pumtIve damages are bemg mterpreted 
m the state courts. Also class actions, that started out as a federal rule, are now 
recogmzed m all state rules. 
Many state cases that used to be tned as mdivldual cases now are bemg brought 
as class actIOns m the state courts. That means there IS a lot of money on the line. 
I served on a Texas Intennediate appellate court m Dallas. It dealt with both civil 
and cnmmal appeals. I came to that court from a civil tnal bench. But a good 
fnend and colleague of mme came to that court from a cnmmal distrIct bench. One 
of the very first arguments he handled was m a civil case. And the lawyers almost 
came to blows dunng their argument. My colleague said, "Walt, walt, walt, where' s 
the dead body? I mean, there s no dead body m thiS case. There were no fireanns 
used. What's the big deal?" But I explamed later to my colleague, "you Just don't 
understand; It's always money" 
I suggest that the reason there IS more money gomg mto the state races IS because 
these courts deal, day m and day out, wIth big Issues mvolvmg both the plamtiff's 
bar and the defense bar. And how the state supreme court rules means real dollars 
to them and theIr clients. 
And to Mr. Hantler-he was here earlier, I may have mIssed him now-he said 
he was all m favor of the electIon of Judges and he works With Datmler Chrysler. 
And I was tempted to say, "Show me the money" 
That IS really the truth. The truth IS that, If you are gomg to have an election of 
Judges, then the Judges are gomg to have to get theIr message out. And to get theIr 
message out, they are gomg to have to be able to have access to resources necessary 
to pay for theIr messages' dissemmatton. 
In Texas, there are more population centers of 100,000 10 varIOUS parts of the 
state than any other place m the country There are sixteen major media markets. 
Dallas, Ft. Worth, and Houston only have 60% of the vote. If I am gomg to 
campaIgn stateWide, It will take me $600,000 to $800,000 Just for two weeks ofTY 
publiCity 
And assummg It takes a doBar to earn a dollar, then It costs $1.6 million to run 
Just a two-week campaIgn m Texas If you want to have an effect on the voter. 
So then, let me talk about campaign contributIons. I became a Judge and subject 
to electIon at a tIme when Texas had no limits on campaign contributIOns. By the 
tIme I got to the court of appeals, the notIOn that Judges might set voluntary limits 
on contributIons as a JudiCIal refonn was gammg steam. It resonated With a 
commumty that wanted you to be accountable, but not too accountable, that wanted 
you to be mdependent, but not too mdependent. 
Campaign contributIOn limits sent a middle of the road message. Essentially we 
recognized that we had to raIse campaign contributIOns, but we agreed to not let any 
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one mdivldual gIVe us so much money that It would raise the specter that we might 
be mfluenced 10 our JudicIal deCISIOns. 
I set mme at a pretty low limit. IrOnIcally, I then raised more money than I had 
ever raised before. It turned out that by settmg a limit, people actually started 
glVmg more money to my campaign. That was not too bad! 
Also, one of the very effective thmgs about a campaign contributIOn limit IS It 
reqUIres you to have a much broader base of support. One goal of mme was to have 
less than half of my money come from the lawyers, more than half from other 
sources than lawyers. By havmg a campaign contribution limit, you almost assure 
that you could not raise the money necessary 10 Texas to run an effective campaign 
Without haVIng to reach out to other members of the commumty for contributIOns. 
But here IS a rub. When I first started runnIng as aJudge, campaign contributions 
from lawyers did not bother me. I reasoned that I saw these lawyers day 10 and day 
out, and they won some and lost some. So I did not sense any particular concern 
about anyone case. On the other hand, one day, I got a contribution 10 the mail, and 
then a second contributIOn. I did not recognize the names. Because I did not know 
who these people were, It sent off warnmg bells. Even my court admmlstrator, who 
knew all the lawyers 10 town, didn't recognize the names so I Just held the checks. 
About two days later, I was prepanng for a hearIng and whoa, the contributors were 
parties 10 the heanng. I sent the money back. 
The Irony of all of this IS that 10 Texas today, if you qUIz the public, they will tell 
you that they thmk the worst thmg a Judge can do IS take contributIons from 
lawyers. The best thmg a Judge can do IS take contributIOns from mdivlduals. 
Well, okay So, half of my contributIOns are from lawyers, half are from 
mdivlduals. So, now I bother both myself and the public. I guess that IS Just the 
way the system works. There IS another thmg about voluntary contribution limits 
that I would suggest to you. By makIng them you have to reach out for a broader 
base of support, I find that people get a lot more mterested 10 your campaIgn. 
If you can get somebody to put that two dollar bet down on the horse race, they 
have a much stronger mterest 10 seemg the race through. There are those who say, 
"the nch can buy the electIOns if you have campaign contributIOn limits, because 
only they will have the funds necessary to WIn." And sometimes, that happens. But 
more often than not, It seems to me that you can create a tremendously broad base 
of support by smaller contributIOns. Dunng the early part of George Bush's 
campaIgn, as he was gearIng up, there was a lot of the natIOnal media giVIng him 
very little credit for what he was able to do. 
But there was a little statistIc out there that I thought was very telling. At one 
pomt In hIS campaign, $60 million or somethIng was the mark he had reached, hIS 
average contribution was $500. 
There was a lot of press gIven to hIS raIsIng huge amounts of money But if hIS 
average contributIOn was $500, Just thInk how many people bet on that horse race. 
And It seems to me that IS what pulled him through. 
Are Judges different than other politiCIans? Another questIOn I heard. The 
answer IS yes, I thmkJudges are different. If! am runlllng for the legIslature, If! am 
runnIng for governor, I can tell you, "ThiS IS my agenda. I am for strong education. 
I am gomg to pay the teachers more. I am gomg to reduce your taxes. I am gOIng 
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to reduce the property tax. Now, if you agree With me, contribute to my campaign 
so I can go sell my name to all these people, get my message out, and I can wm." 
On the other hand, can ajudge address school finance because It IS an Important 
Issue for hiS or her constituency? With a school finance case pending, can a voter 
ask how are you gomg to rule? What can a judge say but "I'm sorry I can't answer 
that questIOn. That's a case that might come pending before me, and I've got to 
obey the law Now, how about contributmg to my campaign so I can be elected to 
the bench?" 
That IS the difference, It seems to me, between judges and people who are elected 
to the legislative or executive branches. 
For all of the First Amendment diSCUSSIOn about electIOn versus appomtment, I 
thmk all of thiS today really focuses on just a central notIOn. The public wants the 
judges to be accountable, but just not too accountable. And they want the Judges 
to be mdependent, but Just not too mdependent. 
QUESTION & ANSWER 
PROFESSOR DEBOW· Thanks, Justice Enoch. Time for questions. I will 
paraphrase your questions from thiS microphone. So, the more succmct you are, the 
more accurate I will be m repeatmg your question. 
Okay, a two-part questIOn: What about these specific forms of Judicial 
candidates' approach to a potential contributor? And secondly, what sort of 
enforcement action would be appropnate m cases where the rules are not followed? 
PROFESSOR SCHOTLAND: There are only four states m which judges are 
completely free to directly SOliCit, mduding Texas and California. And I do not 
remember the other two states. Everywhere else, It must be done by a committee. 
And maybe I am just a formalist, but I thmk there IS a slgmficant case for trymg 
to build that bit of insulatIOn between the judge and the fundrmsmg. 
I thmk It IS also very Important to be very realistic. I know, In fact, that often the 
fundralser SitS nght there, and the fundralsmgjudge Sits nght there. And the only 
question IS, who happens to get to the person first? 
And the Judge IS saymg, "Do I now say thank you for your support, or do I say 
I sure hope you can support." And the fundralser lS saymg, "We really would like 
if you could send It." 
I remember an Arkansas Intermediate Appellate woman judge who was Just the 
exemplary, splendid judge, who said, "You know, I really never looked at anythmg 
about who gave. It doesn't come to my desk. I don't look at the reports. I go out 
of my way to make sure I don't know who gave. They come up to me at Bar pICnICS 
and they tell me." 
PROFESSOR DEBOW· A question about the McCam-Femgold proposal-
MR. BARAN: McCam-Femgold takes a multifaceted approach. In additIOn to 
bannmg certam types of advertlsmg by certam groups pnor to an electIOn, It also 
reqUires disclosure by mdivlduals, or groups of mdivlduals, who are not 
mcorporated and who run advertlsmg dunng certam penods of tlme. So, If a 
wealthy mdivldual wanted to pay for an ad that did not expressly name or expressly 
advocate the electIOn or the defeat of a clearly Identified candidate, but discussed 
a particular candidate by name, then he or she would have to file a report With the 
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Federal ElectIOn Conunlsston. All of us 10 Washmgton are trymg to figure out how 
thiS IS gomg to work. 
Furthermore, If McCain-Feingold passes, the first thmg we all know IS gomg to 
happen IS that groups are gomg to try and figure out what kInd of advertlsmg they 
can fmance WIthOut bemg subject to McCa1O-F e1Ogold' s prohibItIons and disclosure 
requIrements. 
But I thmk I have come up With an ad that might be okay if this regime became 
law. It would be somethmg along the lines of a pIcture of an mdivldual's profile, 
like one of those old eighteenth century silhouettes, With a question mark on It. The 
message would be: "There IS a Congressman who supports public funding of 
abortIOns. Now, we can't tell you the name of that Congressman, or show you the 
Congressman's picture, because thiS Congressman also voted for a bill that would 
make It a cnme for us to do so. But we think we can give you hiS phone number." 
(Laughter.) 
MR. BARAN: "So, why don't you call that person, who we are by law not allowed 
to Identify, and ask him why he IS do1Og that." That IS, I thmk, what we are gOing 
to be reduced to. 
PROFESSOR SCHOTLAND: May I Just pick up on Chief Justice Keith's usmg the 
words of how McCam-Femgold will work, and make a not bold predictIOn? 
If you could buy stock m state parties, I would buy a lot nght now because a lot 
of money will flow to the state parties if we keep It from flowmg to the natIonal. 
PROFESSOR DEBOW· Other questIons? The questIon IS about sort of a 
transparency, I guess, of candidates who are supposedly non-partisan ralsmg funds. 
PROFESSOR SCHOTLAND: This IS the first thmg that the JustIce has said that I 
could take any Issue With. The leading troublemakmg campaign pitch by JudiCial 
candidates IS "Tough on crune." And we have It 10 all forms. We have It m not all 
states, but an awful lot. 
One of the reasons he and hiS colleagues look so good IS they do not have any 
cnmmal cases. They sent that over to another court, so they can be real JudiCial 
statesmen, and they are, In fact, real JudiCial statesmen. It speaks very well of 
PreSident Bush, the appomtments, the kmd of appoIntments he made to that Court 
when he was Governor. 
We had somebody rurmmg down m Houston, MarlOn Bloss. She ran an ad, "You 
do the cnme, you do the tIme." Tough Marlon. 
And by the way, she put the picture of her opponent m the bottom of the ad. Why 
would anybody put a picture of an opponent In their own campaign ad? Well, if you 
want to get blunt about It, It IS racism. They put m pictures of black opponents. 
And some put pictures of Latino opponents. 
We had a fellow m Nevada, an Incumbent Supreme Court Justice, who 
campaigned through the state arm and arm With the Attorney General. And they 
were on a tough on cnme platform. Later, there was an effort to have that Justice 
recuse himself. All of his colleagues, except one, the Chief, agreed he did not have 
to recuse himself. 
The Chief wrote an absolutely beautiful, blistenng dissent. So, I am afraid I 
cannot go along With the propOSition that JudiCial candidates do not go out and say 
"tough on cnme." That IS the leading, smgle bad problem. 
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Let me try to tum thIS to a happy event. There was a wonderful epIsode m Cook 
County, WhICh has eIther a weekly or bIweekly Cook County Insh newspaper. In 
Cook, as m many other places, the best thmg IS an Insh name, as mentIOned earlier. 
But a fellow named O'Riley was runnmg. And he ran a half-page ad, "O'Riley" 
for whatever It IS. And he, m fact, gets elected. And after the electIOn, he runs 
another ad, except thIs IS a full-page one. 
And he has a great bIg pIcture of hIS very happy smiling black face saymg, 
"Thank you, brothers and sIsters." 
